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Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity
to share my thoughts on basic monetary prob-
lems with this Committee. I will attempt to set
forth and analyze what I believe are the major
issues and the appropriate policies to deal with
them. In that context, I will deal with the ques-
tions you raised in your letter of June 19.t*
As you pointed out in calling these,hearings,
two of the most serious problems currently fac-
ing the U.S. economy are an unprecedented rate
of peace-time inflation and a record high level of
interest rates. The present inflation is especially
pernicious because many of the largest price in-
creases have been for necessities such as food,
housing and fuels, so that the poor and those
living on reduced retirement income have been
the hardest hit. Such perverse effects of inflation
tend to negate the attempts of the government
in recent years to assist such groups with direct
government programs. Similarly, it is clear that
the current high level of interest rates has
created serious dislocations and strains in our
economy. These include the adverse impact on
the housing market, the large capital losses to
those persons in all walks of life who have put
their savings into stocks and bonds, directly or
through mutual funds and pension trusts, and
the threat to the liquidity of financial institu-
tions.
*Footnotes at end of article.
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World-wide problem
As you are aware, the problems of rampant
inflation and extremely high interest rates are
not restricted to the United States. All of the
major industrial countries are experiencing sim-
ilar, or even higher rates of inflation, and the
high interest rates which go with these rates of
inflation. A significant share of our current in-
flation results from the fact that the prices of
many basic goods-such as oil, wheat, cotton,
and. lumber-are determined in the interna-
tional market place, rather than in the U.S.
market alone. Thus, worldwide inflation acts to
exacerbate and complicate our domestic irrlia-
tion problem. For similar reasons, the resolu-
tion of our current inflation· and high interest
rate problems does not lie completely within
our hands, but rather requires the cooperation
of the major industrial countries of the world.
What has led to this unprecedented world-
wide inflation? Some observers would cite ex-
cessive monetary and fiscal expansion as the
major immediate cause. But since I do not be-
lieve that governments and central banks act
out of blind ignorance or perverse motives, we
must consider the social and political climate
which tends to produce a bias toward inflation-
ary policies. Onemajor factor appears to be the
increasing pressure on the world's available re-
sources which has been created by a growing
and more affluent population with ever-rising"Billions of Dollars
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Our domestic inflation problem owes much
to the fact that the Federal Government in the
United States has run deficits in 14 of the last
15 fiscal years. These deficits, which occurred
in all phases of the business cycle, have ex-
o
Inflation problem reflects continued deficit
spending, especially in recent years
domestic unemployment. The consequent inter-
vention in foreign-exchange markets by other
governments substantially increased the domes-
tic money supply in these countries as they
bought dollars by issuing their own money
through central bank operations. Thus the well-
publicized dollar overhang was matched by for-
eign monetary expansion. Simultaneous mone-
tary expansion in all major industrial countries
helped to foster a simultaneous business-cycle
boom around the world, which aggravated the
inflation from which we all now are suffering.
Having noted the worldwide inflationary cli-
mate, I would now like to turn to a more
specific analysis of the underlying factors that
have produced rampant inflation in the United
States, even in the face of a softening in eco-
nomic activity. It may be helpful to put this
problem in historical perspective, before at-
tempting to assess possible cures.
This movement out of dollars accelerated in
the period after the U.S. suspended convertibil-
ity of the dollar into gold in August, 1971. The
movement only came to a halt in March 1973,
when most industrial countries floated their ex-
change rates, and thereby rang down the curtain
on the Bretton Woods system of fixed-exchange
rates.2 In the period up to March 1973, foreign
governments resisted an appreciation in value
of their own currencies vis-a-vis the dollar be-
cause they believed that it would hurt their
export industries, slow their growth, and create
expectations for a higher standard of living.
Another key factor appears to be the increased
priority that governments have assigned to
achieving a fully employed economy, both here
and abroad, since World War II. Given this
priority, governments have committed them-
selves to ongoing, expansionary domestic poli-
cies to prevent "unacceptable" levels of unem-
ployment from developing. These secular
developments have tended to create an under-
lying inflationary bias in government policies
throughout the world.
The cultural and economic forces generated
over the past three decades have provided the
basis for our present inflationary experience,
but they do not explain why serious worldwide
inflation occurred in the first half of the 1970's,
rather than the second half of the 1960's, or at
some other period. The reasons for the timing
of our problems are complex. However, one
element which has not r((ceived as much atten-
tion as it deserves is the breakdown of the Bret-
ton Woods System, and the decline in recent
years in foreign confidence in the U.S. dollar.
Inthe years from the end of World War II until
the mid-1960~s, the world looked on the U.S. as
the strongest and most stable country, and the
dollar as the strongest and most stable currency.
As a result, both foreign governments and pri-
vate persons tended to accumulate dollar assets.
But as the U.S. sUffered an almost unbroken
string of deficits in our balance of payments,
and as the U.S. inflation rate gradually acceler-
ated in the late 1960's towards 6 percent, confi-
dence in the dollar weakened, and there was an
incentive to switch out of dollars into other cur-
rencies.
4panded the Federal debt by $193 billion, or 67
percent since 1959. Federaldeficits became an
especially critical problem with the major esca-
lation of the Vietnam war in mid-1965. The size
of these deficits increased at an alarming rate
during the Vietnam build-up period between
1966 and 1968 when the economy was at, or
near, full employment. The fiscal situation was
temporarily relieved by the belated income-tax
surcharge inmid-1968, and by a leveling off in
military expenditures at about the same time.
However, .the situation deteriorated further in
1969-70 when outlays for civilian programs
outstripped recession-reduced revenues, and
became still worse in the 1971-73 period when
a full-blown expansion got underway.
Itcan be argued that a tighter monetary pol-
icy ought to have been able to offset the infla-
tionary effects of this large, sustained deficit
financing. In theory this may be true, but in
practice theopposite has tended to occur. When
huge Federal credit demands are added to those
of a fully-employed private sector, interest rates
tend to rise sharply. There are some sectors of
the economy, such as housing construction, and
programs financed with municipal bonds, jhat
are especially sensitive to such a development
because they depend heavily upon long-term
credit. Because high interest rates have an un-
even impact onthe economy, demands for relief
are quickly heard. For example, in the spring of
1973, there was a serious effort made by some
members of Congress to freeze interest rates, or
even toroll them back to the level of January 1,
1973.
In short, large-scale deficit financing by the
Government tends to bring great pressures on
the central bank to keep interest rates from ris-
ing to "unreasonable," "unacceptable," or
"dangerous" levels. Unfortunately, the only way
the mounting credit demands can be satisfied
without an increase in interest rates in the short
run is for the Federal Reserve to accelerate the
growth of money and credit. But if done for too
long, or to an excessive degree, such action can
generate inflationary pressures which may per-
sist for a long period of time and result in even
higher interest rates in the long run.
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It has been my observation that large and
persistent Federal deficits are a major factor in
pulling monetary policy off course, in the direc-
tion of excessive monetary expansion, as the
central bank attempts to cope with the conflict-
ing pressures that develop. Too often in prac-
tice, therefore, an expansionary fiscal policy
tends to generate excessive expansion in money
and credit.
Priority of employment goal
The second major factor tending to inhibit
the use of monetary policy in combatting infla-
tion is the conflict in national goals that often
occurs as between "full employment" and stable
prices. Since the early 1960's, the"full employ-
ment" goal in the U.S. generally has contem-
plated an unemployment rate of 4 percent or
less. Such a rate was regarded by many as a
practical minimum, in view of the normal shift-
ing of workers between jobs and the lack of
marketable skills of some job-seekers. When-
ever the conventional or aggregate unemploy-
ment rate has exceeded 4 percent, pressures
have developed for expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies. For example, recently there have
been demands for a tax cut to take up slack in
the economy and to reduce our conventional or
aggregate unemployment rate from the 5.2 per-
cent level that prevailed last month. Were such
policies to be undertaken, I greatly fear that
they would simply accelerate the already ex-
tremely high inflation rate in the U.S.
In my view, there has not been enough policy
use of a refined analysis of the employment and
unemployment data, concentrating on the "hard
core" of our labor force-i.e., heads of house-
holds or "breadwinners"-for whom the social
and economic costs of unemployment are the
highest. Among this group, the unemployment
rate last month was only 3.1 percent, in contrast
to the conventional or aggregate unemployment
rate of 5.2 percent.
The significance of a 4 percent aggregate un-
employment. rate has gradually changed over
time because of shifts in the composition of the
labor force. An earlier study by George Perry ofthe Brookings Institution,3 and a more recent
study by Eckstein and Brimmer for the Joint
Economics Committee4 suggest that a 4 percent
unemployment rate today represents a much
tighter labor market than it did twenty years
ago, in view of the increased participation in the
labor market by teenagers and other new en-
trants who also lack marketable skills. Gener-
ally, it now seems to take a higher rate of infla-
tion to achieve a 4 percent unemployment rate
thanit did some years ago, because of those fac-
tors. Thus if we should now attempt to follow a
monetary policy aimed at reducing unemploy-
ment to 4 percent, the likely consequence would
be to exacerbate present inflationary pressures,
which have already reached dangerous levels.
This, of course, is not to imply that monetary
and fiscal policy should never be used to help
deal with unemployment. What it does mean is
that, because of shifts in structure of the labor
force, there may be a change over time in the
practical minimum unemployment target that
can be achieved through expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policies without creating an un-
acceptable rate of inflation. Thus, some knowl-
edgeable observers would hold that, because of
the shift in the composition of the labor force
already noted, the practical minimum target
today might be about 4Y:2-5 percent as far as
measures to stimulate aggregate demand
through monetary and fiscal policy are con-
cerned.
In these circumstances, a very useful way to
fight unemployment is to attack the structural
source of the problem by helping to increase the
marketable skills of those groups who lack ex-
perience. Such measures as low-interest educa-
tion loans to youth and minority groups, re-
training programs directed toward skills where
job vacancies are high, and steps to facilitate
worker mobility are all important in this con-
text. Rather than imposing inflation on every-
one by attempting to reach our employment
goals through expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies, our aim should be a much more vigor-
ous use of selective means to deal with these
specific problems. We need a high-powered rifle
shot approach, rather than the shotgun ap-
proach of monetary and fiscal policy.
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For whatever reason, there has been a tend-
ency for the goal of "full employment" to take
priority over stable prices, in view of actions in
recent years by the Administration and Con-
gress-whose job it is to determine national
priorities. Not enough attention seems to have
been paid to the trade-off~i.e., the additional
inflation that must be accepted to get a lower
unemployment rate. In essence, my argument is
thatwe have had both a faulty diagnosis, and in
part the wrong medicine, for the unemployment
goal. Firstwe need a more meaningful "target
rate" for unemployment, as I have explained.
Secondly, we need new perceptions and new
remedies for structural unemployment, particu-
larly among teenagers, minority groups and
parHime women workers.
Lags in monetary policy impact
A third major factor which tends to inhibit
the use of monetary policy in combatting infla-
tion, and which results in calls for its use to
provide short-term stimulus to the economy, is
a complicated technical one. Namely, the lags
in the effects of a change in monetary policy
seem to be shorter for production, employment
and profits than for prices. Admittedly, our
knowledge about the length of those lags is im-
perfect. But it is reasonably clear that the "good
news" from easy money appears first, with pro-
duction, employment, and profits expanding
within, perhaps, 6 to 12 months. However, the
"bad news" comes later, in the form of in-
creased inflation with a lag of perhaps 1 to 3
years. Conversely, if a tight money policy is
adopted, the bad news of a dampening eco-
nomic activity comes first, whereas the good
news of a diminished rate of inflation is delayed.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that
elected officials who must face the voters at reg-
ular intervals tend to prefer an easy money
policy.
Monetary policy too expansive
Thus, it may be asked, has monetary policy
been a principal cause of our inflation problem,with the accompanying high level of interest
rates,and could this have been avoided if mon-
etary policy had been tighter in recent years? In
testimony earlier this year before the Congress,
Chairman Burns acknowledged that, with the
benefit of hindsight, monetary policy may have
been overly expansive in 1972. Some of our
critics, such as Professor Milton Friedman,
would go much further-alleging that the
money supply has grown too fast since about
1970, and that this played a major role in pro-
ducing the current inflation.
Such criticism, whether or not fully justified,
is easy enough to make, based both on mon-
etary theory and statistical studies, but it seems
to me to ignore real problems in the real world.
No central bank can be or should be wholly in-
dependent of government. The elected repre-
sentatives of the people of the United States,
both the Congress and the Administration, must
have the ultimate responsibility for economic
policy. The Federal Reserve System must take
account of the high priority which the Congress
and the Administration have assigned to full
employment and economic growth, which has
often conflicted with stable prices. Central
banks cannot completely ignore such impera-
tives-even against their better judgment. It is
vital that this matter be thoroughly appreciated,
not only by the Congress and the Administra-
tion, but also by the business and financial com-
munity and the general public. It is only in this
way that we can get support for the belt-tighten-
ing measures needed to overcome the corro-
sive problem of rampant inflation and sky-high
interest rates.
Inflation and financial markets
Having dealt at length with "what went
wrong," I would next like to deal with the press-
ing question of "where do we go from here."
Specifically, I will attempt to assess the conse-
quences of severe inflation for the economy and
financial markets and the policy options avail-
able to deal with these problems. But first, I
must emphasize the crucial role which inijation
plays in causing high interest rates.
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Interest rates, as the price of money, are de-
termined by the supply and demand for funds,
which in turn are critically influenced by infla-
tion expectations. On the supply side, in a.pe-
riod of inflation lenders will expect an interest
premium to compensate for the erosion by in-
flation of the value of their assets. On the de-
mal1dside, the need for funds in a period of in-
flation is boosted by rising prices of new plant
equipment, inventories and consumer goods.
Additionally, expectation that repayment will
be in depreciated dollars will also add to de-
mand for credit. The resultant heavy credit de-
mands push rates even higher.
It is crucial to realize that the sharp escala-
lation of interest rates in the first half of 1974
has occurred despite a continued growth in
the money supply at a rate which some of our
critics fear is still too large to be non-inflation-
ary. According to latest estimates, the narrowly-
defined money supply (M 1) rose at an annual
rate of 7.0 percent in the first six months of
1974. Thus, the extremely high level of interest
rates has stemmed principally from forces set
in motion by inflation itself-i.e., by an infla-
tion premium in interest rates and the way in
which inflation magnifies credit needs.
In a very real sense, the double-digit infla-
tion and accompanying high interest rates from
which we are now suffering reflect inflationary
policies of the past, the symptoms of which
were temporarily suppressed during the period
August 1971 to early 1973 by wage and price
controls under various programs. Unfortu-
nately, the inflationary process is not quickly re-
versible, and it will probably require several
years to reduce the rate of inflation, and hence
interest rates, to more reasonable levels. If sole
reliance continues to be placed on monetary
policy to do the job, unaided by fiscal restraint,
it may take even longer. It is vital to recognize
that rampant inflation cannot be brought under
control without sustained monetary and fiscal
restraint, in the U.S. or any other country. I
believe that this conviction is shared by most
economists of all schools of thought. Thus, the
great challenge that we face in the process of
licking inflation is to design the best measures
to restrain demand.and to increase supplies.High and rising interest rates have taken
their toll on financial markets. To the man in
the street, some of the most obvious results
have been the decline in the stock market and
the·sharply reduced supply of funds for home
loans· at savings institutions. These institutions
have. endured heavy withdrawals of funds, as
depositors placed their funds in higher yielding
market instruments, and tht consequence has
been a major curtailment oHunds to the hous-
ingindustry. To the man on Wall Street, the
dangers have been just as ominous. For ex-
ample, public utilities have experienced serious
difficulties in raising money in the capital mar-
ket, and the commercial banks have had in-
creasing problems in raising funds to meet
heavy loan demands.
The market disruptions caused by high inter-
estrates, in turn, have seriously affected the real
economy. Those who have invested in stocks
and bonds, directly or through mutual funds
and pension trusts, have suffered substantial
capital losses, and have become poor sales pros-
pects for new homes, new cars and other big-
ticket items. And higher borrowing costs gen-
erally have contributed to higher prices of most
goods and services.
One may certainly ask whether we must put
up with such severe dislocations in the financial
markets and the overall economy. Unfortu-
nately, the answer to this question appears to be
yes. A policy specifically aimed at reducing in-
terest rates now would require massive injec-
tions of reserves into the banking system by the
Federal Reserve and an acceleration in the
growth of money and credit. The result might
be a temporary levelling off or decline in in-
terest rates, and a short-run rise in output. But
in the longer run, this policy would cause an
even sharper rise in prices, \fhich in turn would
cause interest rates to rise e~en higher.
Since high interest rates have had such pain-
ful consequences, it is pertinent to ask whether
they have done any good in moving toward a
solution to the inflation problem. I see mount-
ing indications that the high cost of credit is
having the desired rationing effect, both from
the standpoint of borrowers and lenders, in
8
"cooling off" the economy. This is a necessary
first stepin purging the economy of inflationary
excesses and starting on the long road back to-
ward stable and non-inflationary growth.
Policy recommendations
What can policymakers do to extricate the
economy from the present situation of surging
inflation and high interest rates? I believe that
several major lessonsare implicit in what I have
already said about the dangers of inflation and
of unbalanced policy responses. However, these
lessons can be summarized in the following four
specific policy recommendations.
1. Longer-term policy horizons. Both with
regard to'monetary and fiscal policy, I suggest
that we explicitly recognize the lagged effects
of policy measures, and work within somewhat
longer time horizons than has been the custom
in the past. In our present uphill battle against
inflation, we should expand our policy-planning
horizons to at least three years to measure the
effect of policy actions being taken currently. A
planning horizon which does not capture the
full consequences of current policy actions, es-
pecially with regard to prices, necessarily has an
inflationary basis.
2. Budget reform. I applaud Congress' ef-
forts this year in moving toward budget reform.
By setting up new machinery that will deal with
the budget as a single entity, you are in effect
creating a vested interest devoted to the cause
of economic stabilization. For the first time
Congress will be able to vote on fiscal policy:
But beyond that, it seems essential to push for
actual budgets which are restrictive in periods
of severe inflation. The best fiscal policy for fis-
cal 1975 would be at least a balanced budget, or
preferably a surplus, instead of the $11.4 bil-
lion deficit currently projected. In my judgment,
this is the most important single step that the
Congress could take to relieve inflationary pres-
sures and to reduce the level of interest rates.
Up to the present, far too great a burden has
been placed on monetary policy, with the anti-
inflation effort centered around credit controls
and the resulting high price of credit.3. Economic priorities. I would recommend
an amendment to the Employment Act of 1946,
stating explicitly that price stability is a co-
equal goal of economic policy, along with
"maximum employment, production, and pur-
chasing power." Further, I would suggest mak-
ing explicit inpolicy decisions the implicit trade-
off between full employment and stable prices
whenever a conflict arises between these two
goals. In the past, our laudable emphasis on the
full-employment goal has caused us to down-
play other necessary objectives, with the results
we see today.
4. Monetary policy. If we are to overcome in-
flation, the Federal Reserve System must have
Congressional and Administration support in
pursuing a non-inflationary growth target for
money and credit-even if high interest rates
and some increase in unemployment are neces-
sary in the short run, as inflationary forces are
wrung out of the economy. It is particularly vi-
tal that we not be pulled off course toward ex-
cessive credit ease by the two major forces that
have done so in the past-i.e., the necessity to
finance large-scale budget deficits, and the ten-
dency to call for easy money to solve structural
unemployment problems that could be handled
better through selective measures of the type
I've described.
Concluding comments
My testimony, Mr. Chairman, has attempted
to deal with the broad problems raised in your
letter of June 19. Now I would like to conclude
with a brief recapitulation directed specifically
toward the six issues noted in that letter that
involve some dispute in monetary economics.
While recognizing that there are differences of
opinion on these matters, both within and with-
out the Federal Reserve System, my own views
are summarized below.
1. The reliability of the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment as a guide
for monetarypolicy.
The trade-off between inflation and un-
employment seems to be unstable and
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subject to change. In recent years, it ap-
pears that the trade-off has worsened-
Le., it now takes more inflation to pro-
duce a given decline in unemployment.
Even with the recent 11.5 percent infla-
tion rate, the unemployment rate last
month was 5.2 percent. Moreover, the
trade-off appears to be a short-run phe-
nomenon. Inthe long run, say, three years
or more, a higher inflation rate will not·
"buy" a lower unemployment rate. Only
in the short run of one to two years will
we possibly observe a higher rate of infla-
tion leading to a temporary decline in un-
employment. This observation follows
from the widely accepted doctrine that in
the long run the growth in the money sup-
ply affects only the general price level,
while in the short run the principal effects
are on production and employment.
2. Benefits and risks involved in the Fed-
eralReserve accommodating non-recur-
ring price increases originating in supply
shortfalls and other special events.
It is my view that the Federal Reserve
should seldom, if ever, accommodate
price increases originating from supply
shortfalls and other transitory events. This
will no nothing to ease the supply prob-
lem, and by facilitating higher prices, it
will contribute to a higher permanent rate
of inflation. As Chairman Burns said last
winter, we recently have had a shortage
of oil, not a shortage of money, and we
cannot increase the supply of the former
by increasing the supply of the latter.
3. The benefits and risks involved in mone-
tizing deficit spending.
As I indicated earlier, it is undesirable for
the Federal Reserve to monetize the defi-
cits of the Federal Government in periods
of full or nearly-full utilization of re-
sources. At such times, the monetization
of Federal deficits tends to pull monetary
policy off course toward excessive mone-
tary expansion, and thus contributes to
inflation. In periods of recession, on the






mand for these funds. However, short-run
changes in money growth have little if
any direct effects on the overall rate of in-
flation. In the long run, sustained changes
in the rate of growth in the money supply
are a major determinant ofthe rate of in-
flation, and expectations of future infla-
tion rates. Since current rates of inflation
and inflation expectations are major de-
terminants of the current level of interest
rates, sustained changes in the rate of
money growth will have a major effect on
the level of interest rates. The lesson here.
is that efforts to reduce interest rates by
accelerating money growth in the short
rlIO will be self-defeating in the long run.
Thus, excessive easymoney over a period
of several years leads to inflation, which









High interest rates reflect price inflation,
and in turn high rate of money growth
Percent.-----------------.
4. The benefits and risks involved in the
Federal Reserve fighting money market
fires.
A primary function of any central bank is
to act as the lender of last resort to pro-
tect the institutional integrity of the finan-
cial system. In this sense the Federal Re-
serve must "fight money market fires."
Many scholars believe that a serious ag-
gravating factor in the Great Depression
was the Federal Reserve's failure to per-
form this function in an aggressive way.
In my opinion, the Fed has done a credit-
able job in protecting the institutional in-
tegrity of financial markets in recent dec-
ades during periods of liquidity crises,
without letting the money supply get out
of control on the upside.
cial to monetize Federal deficits as part
of a program aimed at recovery. Unfortu-
nately, Federal budget deficits (as mea-
suredby the unified budget) have occurred
in 14 of the last 15 years, irrespective of
the state of the business cycle. There have
been a number of important technical re-
forms in recent years, such as the auction-
ingof Treasury securities, which have re-
duced the Federal Reserve's role in
support of the debt management area.
However, thefundamental solution to the
problem lies in keeping spending in line
with receipts, thereby eliminating the def-
icits when they are not needed to bolster
a sagging economy.
5. Relationships between money supply, in-
flation and interest rates.
The rate of growth in the money supply
is a major influence determining the level
of interest rates in both the short run of a
few months, and in the long run of a few
years. However, the nature of this influ-
ence is quite different in these two time
periods, because of the role of inflation in
these relationsh.ips. In the short run, ac-
celerated money growth can force interest
rates down, and restricted money growth
can force interest rates up, by altering the
short-run supply of funds relative to de-
106. How to use monetary policy to check
inflation and to bring interest rates back
down to reasonable levels.
Monetary policy can check inflation and
bring interest rates back down to rea-
sonable levels through a gradual but
steady policy of reducing the rate of mon-
1. "(1) the reliability of the trade-off between infla-
tion and unemployment as a guide for monetary
policy; (2) the benefits and risks involved in the Fed-
eral Reserve accommodating non-recurring price in-
creases originating in supply shortfalls and other
special events; (3) the positive elements and the risks
involved in monetizing deficit spending; (4) the bene-
fits and risks involved in the Federal Reserve's fighting
money market fires; (5) the relationships between
money supply,inflation, and interest rates; (6) how to
use monetary policy to check inflation and bring inter-
estrates back down to reasonable levels."
Wright Patman letter of June 19, 1974 to John J.
Balles
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etary expansion to a non-inflationary
growth track. But to make this a viable
approach, we will need a powerful assist
from a policy of fiscal restraint, along
with support for making stable prices a
goal of equal importance with economic
growth and full employment.
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